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Abstract
All ages deal with the debate between reform and revolution in the contexts of their
distinctive challenges, problems, and prospects. While reflecting on today’s sociopolitical realities in the U.S., this paper identifies a theoretical stagnancy in academia
that deters any radical praxis for revolution. Addressing some key theoretical stances
within the reform/revolution dyad, the paper argues that any criticism of “revolution in
a linear future” is no easy approval for “reform in a static present” either. Also,
replacing the “apocalyptic future” with the “here and now” of the progressive present
is perhaps inadequate without critically reflecting on the “quality” of the “present”.
This paper does not recommend any specific prescriptive means but outlines a
speculative prospect of “here and now” for revolution. It critiques theoretical stances
of a number of postcolonial and poststructuralist thinkers and argues that these
stances eventually get appropriated within the hegemonic reform-based justice
underpinning neoliberalism. It argues that using the work of Henry Lefebvre, David
Harvey, and Doreen Massey, a spatiotemporal dialectic for revolution can be
developed which in turn also embraces revolutionary visions of Alain Badiou. The
paper explains how this dialectic reveals an inadequacy in the politics of reform and
adjustment within theories of James C Scott, Michel de Certeau, Homi K Bhabha,
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. It shows how liberal justice discourses that
routinely promote reform in an attempt to misguide revolutionary potentials manage to
find a comfort zone in the politics of difference. Specifically, the paper invests in the
interstice between two types of theories to queer the longstanding reform-revolution
dyad..

Section I
'Change Life!' 'Change Society!'-these precepts mean nothing without the production of an
appropriate space."
~ Henry Lefebvre in The Production of Space
Why is it that when we get impatient with the tyranny of a socio-political system, we usually
imagine revolution in a distant future? We do so because our political imagination maintains a
linear spatiotemporal sequence: reform now, revolution later. Queering the reform/revolution
dyad would require queering this linearity and, thereby, questioning the normalcy of our static
political imagination. In this paper, I question such normalcies and argue for a spatiotemporal
dialectic of reform/revolution as an alternative way of understanding the relations between them.
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Such queering is required today to radicalize our political imagination. This is what Henry
Lefebvre suggests when he, as in the epigraph above, argues that without production of
appropriate space, changes to society would mean nothing. Similarly, for Alison Kafer,
radicalizing political imagination means not deferring the chance of revolution endlessly,
because doing so inexorably ushers in “stagnation and acquiescence, an inability to move in any
direction because of a permanently forward-looking gaze.”1 What we require instead is a
dialectic between present and future, between our “now” and our “later”. This dialectic is
required in order to create an ‘appropriate space’ for revolution. This paper attempts to reflect
on some possible means of producing this ‘appropriate space’. It also critiques academia’s
involvement in making our political imagination static.
To begin with, it is helpful to contextualize the reform/revolution dyad in our static
imagination. In other words, how we have been made to pursue reform as an alternative to
revolution can be tracked in understanding the operation of authoritative forces across the sociohistorical formation of different forms of power: sovereign power, disciplinary power, biopower,
and necropower. Sovereign power is the power of the emperor. It is the absolute power having
right over life and death of the subjects. It gets exerted directly on bodies through corporeal
punishment. Thus, sovereign power is punitive and vengeful. The Medieval period, the age of
monarchy, was the heyday of sovereign power. Later, because of gradually changing power
relations in society, sovereign power started to lose its efficacy. Michel Foucault, in Discipline
and Punish, marks the eighteenth century as a transitional phase, a phase in which sovereignty
gets overlaid with a new form of power what Foucault calls disciplinary power. This power also
keeps targeting the body but through different means. As a modern form of power, it establishes
control more with rational means rather than with brutal force. Within this modern form of
power an individual “is [not] amputated, repressed, altered by our social order … [but] is
carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of force and bodies (1991:217), as
Foucault explains. Disciplinary power is productive, not punitive like sovereign power. It is
productive in the sense that it produces docile subjects, not by oppressing bodies physically, but
in and through establishing techniques or conditions within which subjects ‘take birth’ or come
into play.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, this disciplinary power again gets
overlain, this time with "biopower”. Foucault defines biopower as non-disciplinary technology as
it gets “applied not to man-as-body but to the living man …to man-as-species (2003:242).”
Biopower starts controlling larger groups of people with regularization of “the birth rate, the
mortality rate, longevity and so on (2003: 243).” Biopower controls subjects in applying
particular forms of reason such as “forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures (2003:
246).”
To explain how biopower works, Achille Mbembe, in his essay “Necropolitics”, explains the
relations among freedom, politics, and agency, as he argues
[I]t is on the basis of a distinction between reason and unreason (passion,
fantasy) that late-modern criticism has been able to articulate a certain idea of the
political, the community, the subject— or, more fundamentally, of what a good
life is all about, how to achieve it, and, in the process, to become a fully moral
agent (Mbembe:13).
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Mbembe thus marks the technique of biopower, which, for him, is a control through interplay
of reason and unreason. Later, he questions if the same technique should be referred to when we
inquire the conditions within which warfare, drone attack, massive killing, and so on get
performed today. Mbembe states that a choice between life and death, not the interplay of reason
and unreason, is what has occupied the center stage within a new configuration of politics,
communities, and subjects. It is not the promise of the good life any longer which sets terms for
the exertion of power, but physical death, social death, and the threat of death on which the
latest form of power operates. Mbembe calls this "necropower".
The reform/revolution dyad through the ages of sovereign power, biopower and necropower
has accordingly gone through different paradigm shifts. First, let us consider what we might call
reform/revolution 1.0. In this model, reform means changes within an ongoing system so that the
system in question can be fixed to establish the principle of social justice. Revolution, on the
other hand, is throwing away, destroying, or abolishing the system itself to replace it with a new
one. What motivates revolutionary zeal is passion for social justice infused with a new vision of
equality for all. This model was at work in the French Revolution, in the American Revolution,
and in the decolonization of the global South after World War II.
But this understanding of the reform/revolution, especially the notion of activists’ agency in
the pursuit of their passion for justice and equality, needs to be contextualized within the socioeconomic reconfigurations after World War II. With the onset of the neoliberal capitalist
aggression, consent of the people gets increasingly “hijacked” instead of being simply
“manufactured” by nation-states, which in turn start working as components of the machine
called “Empire”2. Later, since the 1990s, with the intensification of neoliberal manipulation
through biopower, and since the 2000s, through its supplementary force, necropower, the consent
of the people gets neither “manufactured” nor “hijacked” but starts being celebrated as “always
already taken” or as “bankrupted.”
This bankruptcy of the people's consent reconstitutes political imagination as disciplined,
domesticated and non-transgressional. Individuals and groups increasingly seek justice within
rights-based frames. All they seek is protection and legal fixes from states while keeping intact
the core structures of injustice: racism, sexism, ableism, patriarchy, capitalism, islamophobia,
trans phobia, and so on. While the Civil Rights Movement sought justice within a biopolitical
conditioning, i.e. “the promise of a better life”, rights-based movements in the post 9/11-world
carefully follow the logic of the necropolitical, the necessity of being protected from social death
and physical death. Instead of integrational movements incorporating HIV activists, prison
activists, LGBT activists, trans activists, black radicals, ecojustice activists, homeless activists,
and so on, all we witness is a pattern of parallel and separate movements. The necropolitical
risk—police brutality, imprisonment, death and so on—in organizing radical social movements,
the necessity to cash out activists’ efforts in short-term goals while endlessly deferring the “nonachievable” ones, the efficacy of identity politics, a form of quick organizing among
homogenous interest groups while not transcending boundaries of race, class, sex, gender, and so
on, are some recent trends that blur the radical vision in the Civil Rights Movement, a vision for
ceaseless united struggle until true equality gets established. Worse, the mainstream LGBT
movement in the US claims affinity with the Civil Rights Movement, but the mainstream LGBT
movement takes the Civil Rights Movement as an end point of the struggle for equality across
racial lines. Also, those involved in the LGBT movement organize themselves while ‘crowding
out’ black people, using the Civil Rights Movement as an analog for their own movement while
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continuing to organize in and through anti-blackness. Regarding the civil rights analogy, Jared
Sexton, for example, points out:
The metaphoric transfer that dismisses the legitimacy of black struggles
against racial slavery (and …its ‘functional surrogates’) while it appropriates
black suffering as the template for nonblack grievances remain one of the defining
features of contemporary political culture (Sexton: 42).
The separate and parallel movements sometimes compete against each other to get closer to
the sovereign in an attempt to victimize others who do not belong to any given interest group.
Sarah Lamble, for example, shows how a partnership between the mainstream LGBT
communities and the police criminalize the immigrants and the Muslims in the UK and the US.
She terms this as ‘queer investments in punishment’3.
This trend of disintegration finds some comfort zone in the popular fetishizing of the politics
of difference in academia. How academia, in the last four decades, has participated in this
bankruptcy of consent and disintegration of social movements and how we can recover from this
constitute two key concerns of this paper. The incorporation of academia within the neoliberal
capitalist project is often criticized as the project of the Military-Industrial-Academic-Complex
(Chomsky, 1997; Robin, 2003; Giroux 2007). What Henry Giroux wrote about his time at Penn
State is still true about all universities: “[…] faculties were becoming irrelevant as an
oppositional force. Many disappeared into discourses that threatened no one, some simply were
too scared to raise critical issues in their classrooms for fear of being fired, and many simply no
longer had the conviction to uphold the university as a democratic public sphere” (as cited in
Hedges, 2009, p. 91). Giroux in the same interview was talking mainly about changes in the
universities especially after the demise of the World Trade Center. However, in general, the
Military-Industrial-Academic-Complex since the 1990s has gone through a paradigm shift from
the Cold War economy to the neoliberal capitalist one. The shift is not just from one of the bipolar world politics to that of the unipolar, it is more about intensification of biopower and
necropower to discipline people while managing an uninterrupted flow of capital across spaces
within the global capitalist economy. Though numerous scholars, critics, and intellectuals like
Henry Giroux, Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein and others have already marked the incorporation
of academia in both phases, an inside story of the participation of academia to the increasing deradicalization of political imagination remains long overdue.
I argue that one of the ways this de-radicalization occurs is in and through the production and
dissemination of certain theories that provide frames to define, influence and shape all possible
discourses, including those of activism and politics. In the era of interdisciplinarity in academia,
we are going through the best of times and the worst of times: the neoliberal and biopolitical
fascism in the name of "democracy" (?) have been more severe than ever but at the same time,
we witness numerous uprisings and protests against this across the world. In this conjuncture,
people finding new hope for revolution must reshape the role of academia so that a much
required radical praxis for revolution can at last emerge.
First, it is important to understand how an increasing number of academic scholars,
researchers and authors promote certain views of power and counter-power which recommend
ceaseless adaptation to and compromise with the hegemonic systems in the form of micropolitics
and identity politics. This is how academia deters radical politics or transformative changes. In
this paper, I will present a case study to show how established concepts of power and counter4
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power within academia are inadequate to bring transformative changes. Also, I will foreground
spatiotemporal dialectics as one of the means towards revolution.
Section II: Influential concepts of power and counter-power in academia
In the age of post-everything theories, academia has moved from structural to poststructural
discourses of power and counter-power. Instead of articulating any systematic and structured
ways of mobilizing dissent, academia routinely foregrounds fragmented, partial, and sporadic
attempts to combat power. Stigmatization of Marxist theories on the one hand, and the increasing
fetishization of poststructuralism, on the other, has obviously inspired people to locate the
operation of power and also the scope of resistance everywhere. I would argue that this
everywhere eventually becomes nowhere since the logic of fragmented combat deprives people
of any adequate forms of resistance. To offer a brief glimpse of the Foucauldian and Deleuzian
concepts of power and counter-power within academia, I would state the following as established
and common views:
a. In an age of the intertwined complexities that emerge within global capitalism, it
is futile to single out particular persons, agents, or even multinational companies for the
miseries of the common people.
b. People should locate and combat power in bits and pieces not because these
would gradually constitute larger momentum but because this is the only way of
combating manipulative forces, since any total resistance is conceptually futile. One way
of combating power is using identity politics that demands rights within the existing
system.
Overall, academia has found it convenient to replace the “totalizing” view of power and
counter power of Karl Marx, for example, with the differential view of Michel Foucault and
Gilles Deleuze.
Though there is a difference between their views of power, both Foucault and Deleuze
believe that power is embedded in all of our practices and social relations so intertwiningly that
any particular nodal point of it is as significant as any other. Foucault, therefore, foregrounds
microphysics of power and Deleuze argues for molecular vestibules of desire as liberating
power. Both of them, however, promote micropolitics or fragmented resistance as means of
counter-power (Buchanan, 2008). Foucault emphasizes an individual’s intersubjectivity as
embodied reality within conflictual operations of power, between the societal domination and the
individuals’ resistance in their attempts to claim power. Foucault believes that power operates at
most micro levels of social relation and he calls this the microphysics of power. Individuals can
be powerful as they attempt to “transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (1988: 18).” Micropolitics of power for
individuals would be gaining the upper hand in the process of intersubjectivity. Deleuze, on the
other hand, considers counter-power or resistance as reactive and replaces it with affirmative
configurations of desire—liberating libido, with the use of which individuals can escape fascism
or repressive impulses. For Deleuze, desire itself is revolutionary in the sense the free-floating
desire would transform both the molecular and the molar configurations of the society but it
should always start with the molecular. Hence transformative changes at the level of the
micropolitical should be given priority. James C. Scott, Michel de Certeau and Homi K Bhabha
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also promote micropolitics in their respective projects. All forms of micropolitics, generally,
recommend resistance in bits and pieces, a technique which does not confront larger structures of
power, such as capitalism, imperialism, racism, patriarchy, et cetera. All forms of micropolitics
fetishize the everyday struggle against the control of power.
Locating micropolitics or infrapolitics in the theoretical legacy of counter-hegemonic
struggle will open up a space for us to understand the nature and objective of micropolitics and
also its relative strengths and weaknesses. James C. Scott in his 1990-book Domination and the
Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts introduced the idea of infrapolitics, an everyday form of
resistance that falls short of openly declared contestations. Scott, attempts to foreground the
superior-subordinate relations in which the subordinate appears to acquiesce willingly to the
stated and unstated expectations of the dominant, and argues that the weak and oppressed of the
society are not free to speak in the presence of power. These subordinate groups instead create a
secret discourse,which Scott labels as “hidden script”,that represents a critique of power spoken
behind the backs of the dominant. .(A similar theory of everyday resistance is developed by
Michel de Certeau in his 1988-book The Practice of Everyday Life. Certeau argues that the
authority in and through some overpowering policies and actions—which he calls “strategies”—
tries to control individuals, who in turn apply tactics, innovative actions to defy, evade, and
critique, if not permanently overthrow, that authority.
In a similar vein, Homi K. Bhabha in his 1994-book The Location of Culture offers concepts
like “sly civility” and “mimicry” as counter-colonial Certeauian tactics which are basically
attempts to evade systemic appropriation by transgressing the colonizer/colonized binary. To
define mimicry Bhabha (1994) writes:
[C]olonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a
subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that
the discourse of mimicry is constructed around ambivalence; in order to be
effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference
(p.122).
As Bhabha argues, colonial discourse wants the colonized to be extremely like the colonizer,
but by no means identical. If there were an absolute equivalence between the two, then the
ideologies justifying colonial rule would be unable to operate. The colonizer assumes that there
is a structural non-equivalence, a split between superior and inferior which explains why any one
group of people can dominate another at all. Bhabha intends to puncture the colonizers’ claim or
assumption of superiority by relying on the slippage of meaning through which the colonized
achieve their agency. This sounds revolutionary only at the expense of dispossessing most of the
colonized people. That is, Bhabha reduces the social to the semiotic and remains lavishly
indifferent to capitalistic management of differences. He may call for constant becoming but
does not consider that people do not have equal capabilities to pursue this constant becoming.
In this paper, I use infrapolitics and micropolitics interchangeably. But it is helpful to
keep in mind that there is a difference between them. This difference is situated in the different
perspectives on power and counter-power:
a) Infra means below or beyond a particular limit of anything. Infrapolitics refer to a
change in the nature of politics: in their everyday negotiations with authoritative forces,
subordinate groups increasingly move away from any direct conflict with structures of
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power. So, instead of appearing as directly confrontational, infrapolitics appear as
evasively subversive.
b) Micropolitics is different from infrapolitics. Micropolitics refers to politics
individuals would perform to attain power since power does not remain in any fixed
center; it is embedded everywhere.
In line with the above distinction, tactics are practical acts which constitute the performance
of infrapolitics.
Politics based on Power and Counter-Power: Micropolitics, Identity Politics and
Coalitional Politics
The concepts of power and counter-power theorized by Foucault, Deleuze, Scott,
Certeau, and Bhabha have gained the academic legitimacy to influence later scholars who
recycle and reproduce these concepts to make the horizon of radical political imagination limited
to the point of being ineffective. To exemplify the different modes of micropolitics offered by
some of these later scholars, I will discuss two texts as part of a case study in order to
understand concepts of power and counter-power celebrated and reinforced within academia.
The texts are Racial Imperatives: Discipline, Performativity, and Struggles against Subjection
(2012) by Nadine Ehlers and, Aloha America: Hula Circuits through the U.S. Empire (2012) by
Adria L. Imada. There are other relevant texts, texts like Native Americans and the Christian
Right: The Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances (2008) by Andrea Smith, which promote
coalitional politics but which,—I would argue,—should also rather embrace the dialectic
between micropolitics and macropolitics.
Nadine Ehlers, in her book Racial Imperatives (2012), uses Michel Foucault’s theory of
power and Judith Butler’s account of performativity to understand how individuals become
‘raced’ subjects. Ehlers excavates the 1925 “racial fraud” case of Rhinelander V. Rhinelander.
The case takes us to New York in the early twentieth century. A man named Leonard charged his
wife Alice with fraud, accusing her of having lured him to wed her by concealing her colored
identity. The jury, after going through the ritual of examining her body,which was stripped naked
and paraded,gave the verdict in favor of Alice: she was unmistakably black. Leonard, in effect,
was found to be “aberrant and deserving of legal and extra-legal reprimand” (3). For the jury,
Leonard defied racial expectations, especially the imperative to maintain white racial purity. For
Ehlers, both Leonard and Alice appear as subversive, as none of them cared to conform to the
expectations of respective racial passing. Alice took shelter in a liminal space, in ambiguity, in
an indeterminacy in which she is not conforming to the either/or kind of binary positioning along
the racial line. By transgressing the border, she is affirming her positioning in a third space. She
thus formulates a new potential for racial agency. Ehlers celebrates it as a transformative gesture.
To make this claim convincing, Ehlers goes for a Foucauldian back up, this time in the theory
of power. Foucault’s phenomenal claim that power has a capillary movement, that power does
not have any center, and that it is moving and relational is emphasized by Ehlers (2012)
rigorously, and she follows this direction only to foreground another Foucauldian claim that
power is not absolute and resistance is immanent in each relation of power:
[p]recisely because power is not owned but exercised or deployed from
multiple and contesting sites, and because of its contingency (it is reliant on
bodies, locations, specific institutions, discursive avenues), the very exercise of
7
	
  

Catalyst: A Social Justice Forum, Vol 6, Issue 1

power always (and necessarily) produces unintended effects. That subjects are
immanent within power networks, and transmit power, means that they can and
do effect resistances that work to reverse, displace, contest, and revise the
objectives of power (p.110).
Excavating the potential for resistance from the Foucauldian archive, Ehlers (2012) connects
it to Butler’s notion of the subject as a site of ambivalence as Butler argued that power at once
acts on the subject and is acted by the subject:
Formed in power, the subject enacts the requirement of power. It is these
requirements that constitute the subject, but the reenactment of this power
operates in such a way as to conceal the prior the working of power. The subject
appears, then, as if they were the origin of power, for these are seen as the
subject’s own power (p. 111).
The next step, which is the cornerstone of the entire effort—to foreground Alice’s agency as
revolutionary—is Butler’s claim that in the recitation or continuous repetition of the
performative, the very potential of agency looms large: “[a]gency is to be found in the
possibilities opened up in and by the constrained appropriation of the regulatory law, by the
materialization of that law’’ (p.111).
Here both Ehlers and Butler are investing in the Certeauian escape route of agency—which is
also argued for by James Scott and Homi K Bhabha, in their respective projects, as they suggest
appropriating the fissures, gaps and inconsistencies within the strategic control of any socioeconomic and political dominance called hegemony. Ehlers fails to notice that the biggest
problem with Alice’s agency is that it segregates itself from the social or the collective. For one
thing, how Alice’s agency will help people struggling against racism is missing in Ehlers’
project. Ehlers would have defended that this does not help resolve the structural crisis but this is
decidedly individual resistance and hence a distinctive one. In fact, the cause of Ehlers’ shortsightedness is her theoretical frame of individualistic infrapolitics and tactics. The negotiation
with structures of power in this case is not directly confrontational; it is indirect, hidden, implicit,
and evasive. So, it is helpful to critique the realm of the undeclared form of resistance. This
realm is situated in more complex social realties than what Certeau implies. What Certeau marks
as agency in the undeclared form of resistance is mere happenstance within a complex web of
social realities in which the dominator/dominated dichotomy is not linear or one dimensional.
Gramsci would have reminded Certeau that individuals in a social context can simultaneously
occupy positions of domination and dominated in their different roles as husband or wife, worker
or manager, rich or poor, white or non-white, et cetera, as Mittelman (212) argues:
In this connection, Gramsci reminded us that subaltern identities are embedded in
complex overlapping social networks in which individuals simultaneously assume
positions of domination and subordination (perhaps as a husband or
wife, an elder or junior, a manager or office clerk, and a donor or recipient
of aid).
Therefore, to address multiple configurations of power within complex social realities we
live in, any project of resistance must engage with larger structures of power: racism, patriarchy,
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capitalism, imperialism, and so on. Otherwise, it is not possible to imagine any interventional
act, be it direct or hidden.
To apply this Gramscian understanding to Ehlers’ project, Alice’s resistance can be
interpreted in a different way from Ehlers’ intended reading. Alice wants to look white, as she
wants to transcend the racial binary. But her becoming white, in her own terms, can be seen as
transferring herself from the realm of the oppressed to the realm of the oppressor, again
following the simplistic logic of Ehlers that mere transcending suggests agency. Alice’s agency
in this reading, then, appears to be a betrayal. It is helpful to keep in mind that the judge did not
find this brand of agency threatening at all; he rather finds that Leonard’s agency may dismantle
the white texture of the society. In this way, Gramsci’s observation regarding the flexible,
unreliable, and simultaneous positioning of the oppressor/oppressed identity sets Ehlers’ project
upside down.
Similarly, Certeau himself is not ambitious enough to expect that his tactics would one day
get transformed into common sense. But followers of Certeau such as Ehlers seem to believe that
the trickledown effect of tactics would help develop “the war of position” (Gramsci: 292) —
social organization in and through cultural hegemony—as Gramsci would like to say. But they
do not notice that no war of position is possible without any attempt to connect the individual
with the social. In a sense, it can be argued that the individualistic tactic, in fact, derails political
dissent by emptying out any potential for the war of position. Certeauvian tactic does so by
occupying the imaginaries of the individuals with a problematic fantasy of cherishing the
subversive mode as an end-in-itself.
Adria L. Imada’s arguments for infrapolitics in her book Aloha America (2012) is not as
circuitous as that of Ehlers. Imada in her book introduces us to the hula performers who,
between 1890s and 1960s, travel across the U.S to perform in theaters, commercial nightclubs,
military bases and various other spaces. Their performances, as Imada argues, help construct a
benign and feminine image of Hawaii. This representation in turn reinforces the colonizercolonized binary as mutually desired. In this way, Imada shows how the hula circuits help
develop an “imagined fantasy”, a powerful imaginary that enables Americans to possess Hawaii
physically, erotically, and symbolically. Imada’s second objective is showing how the touring
hula performances in the US incorporate veiled critique of US expansionism into their
performances. While exposing the nature of this critique performed by the hula circuit, Imada
uses the infrapolitics of Scott and the tactic of Certeau as frames.
The veiled critique of US imperialism accomplished by the hula circuit appears in many
forms. One of them is “kaona”, a hidden meaning embedded in the poetry the hula girls recite
that often serves a counter-colonial archive of collective Hawaiian memory, preserving preconquest histories, epistemologies, and ontologies. Imada takes this hidden meaning or 'kaona' as
reproduction of Scott’s “hidden scripts”. But “kaona”, the hidden meaning, whether in poetry or
performances, remains hidden, and unintelligible to the audience. In fact, it fails to transfer much
dissent, if any, from the hula circuit performers to the larger community of people, especially the
people who know nothing about the historical legacy of hula. As a result, the “kaona” remains
encrypted in the event, and unintelligible beyond the special performers.
In line with James Scott’s concept of “public script”, or Certeau’s “strategy”, Imada finds a
number of ways of getting Hawaiian women interpellated into the structures of colonial
aggression. Women’s bodily movements, for example, are made to provide a scopophilic
pleasure to American audiences as they go on ascribing Hawaiians to a lower order of humanity.
In effect, a kind of colonial script gets written on Hawaiian women and their bodies. Against
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this, as Imada argues, the hula circuit unravels the “public script” by applying the tactics of
“hidden script” in and through a number of counter-colonial activities. (In response to the public
script that shows them as inferior and sexualized objects, the Hawaiian women assert “hula as a
legitimate practice, and present themselves as modern Native women and cosmopolitan tourists”
(Imada, p. 63). For me, this “hidden script” seems to be a romanticized and uncritical version of
the channeling of the potential of dissent. Even though the hula preserves a rich tradition, none
other than the hula girls care to know it. Worse, with their reception of modern American fashion
and costume to, they are conforming to the taste of the imperialist against which their other
counter-colonial tactics are aimed. This makes their counter-colonial stance merely casual, mere
happenstance.
Imada finally claims that the hula girls “appropriate technologies such as studio photography
and urban fashion for their own desires” (p. 64). In an attempt to counteract the sexualized
representation of hula girls, they try to look decent, and dress elegantly.. Also, they offer counter
gazes in studio photographs to deny their objectification. However, what they are doing can be
seen as a particular way of carrying their persona off stage. Their counter gazes may make them
rational humans which in turn falsify their colonized representation as sexualized and subhuman
puppets. At any rate, this way of asserting agency has its own logic and value, but a very limited
one, mainly because it tells one to find a little dignified space within the ongoing public script or
strategy instead of offering any strong challenge to it. Both Ehlers and Imada, much like so
many other scholars in academia, in this way, continue to glorify infrapolitics. In doing so, they
uncritically infatuate postmodern inclination towards fragments and micro-narratives which, in
the end, serves the interest of the neoliberal capitalist (mis)management within whose ambience
the infrapolitics originate and thrive in the first place.
Spatial Politics of Coalition Building
In contrast to fragmented resistance through either individualistic or mechanistically
organized micropolitics, I also observe in strategies of resistance, attempts to form coalitions that
transcend the horizontal categories: race, class, sex, gender, et cetera. Because of the urge to
transcend, this, coalitional politics has radical potential. I will call it spatial infrapolitics, or
spatial micropolitics. Spatial infrapolitics can be discussed with reference to two books: Spaces
of Conflict, Sounds of Solidarity: Music, Race, and Spatial Entitlement in Los Angeles (2013)
and Native Americans and the Christian Right: The Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances
(2008).
In Spaces of Conflict, Sounds of Solidarity (2013), Gaye Theresa Johnson shows how
infrapolitics can go beyond the sphere of the individual and how it can be communal, social,
collective and participatory. “Although racism persisted, resistance always existed”, writes
Johnson, as she foregrounds anti-racist and egalitarian cultural politics between AfricanAmericans and Mexican-Americans in Los Angeles. She theorizes the infrapolitics practiced by
the Black and Brown residents of Los Angeles as “spatial entitlement” and describes it as
“… a way in which marginalized communities have created new collectivities
based not just upon eviction and exclusion from physical places, but also new and
imaginative use of technology, creativity, and spaces. In many instances
overlooked by social historians, everyday reclamation of space, assertion of social
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citizenship, and infrapolitical struggle have created the conditions for future
success, in organized and collective movements” (p. x). (Italics supplied)
Noticeably, spatial entitlement is unique in at least two ways. It prioritizes coalitional politics
over fragmented politics. It seeks for imaginative and creative ways of unlocking spaces as a
critical response to multiple segregation, separation, and exclusion within physical places. In this
sense, it does spatialize infrapolitics as it attempts to establish the tripartite dynamics of time,
place, and social being, as suggested by Henry Lefebvre in The Production of Space. In other
words, spatial entitlement refers to collective struggles, not to any individualistic attempt to seize
upon the cracks and fissures within a hegemonic condition, which latter is promoted by Certeau,
Bhabha, and Scott.
Apparently, Gaye Theresa Johnson aligns her spatial entitlement with the infrapolitics
theorized by James Scott. But importantly, Scott, unlike Johnson, does not provide any futuristic
possibility of infrapolitics. Scott simply zooms in on the sporadic attempts of counter resistance
among farmers in a Malaysian village. Those attempts are inconsistent, and haphazard, though
Scott would have argued that they are "spontaneous", hence, “natural” and, thereby, free from
the romance of revolution, and that the authority—in the imagination of the farmers—is too
powerful to fight against. I strongly criticize this approach of Scott and Certeau as they are
limiting political imagination here. They accept the status quo as inevitable, intact, irreplaceable,
and unchangeable. This is totally against the spirit of the material dialectic of Marx and Harvey,
as I explain in the next section, and it leads us to another important difference between Scott and
Johnson. Scott’s infrapolitics is bereft of any collectivity while Theresa Johnson mobilizes
collective politics as a nucleus to reclamation of shared struggle among "the Blacks and the
Browns". Against housing segregation in the ghettos, spatial entitlement creates new modes of
coalition within a shared soundscape, as Johnson argues:
“[t]hey did not have to be in each other’s physical presence to enjoy the same
music at the same time as it was broadcast to them on radios in living rooms,
bedrooms, neighborhood hangouts, and automobiles. These strategies and
affinities speak to the power of popular music and of popular culture to envision
and create new political possibilities” (p. xiii).
While Certeau, Bhabha, and Scott invest in fragmented politics, Johnson relies on
coalitional politics. In today’s multicultural, multi ethno-racial condition of spaces across the
world, spatial entitlement promises a futuristic politics that stands against multiple forms of
manipulation. Johnson’s spatial entitlement “connects local articulations to international
movements” (xii). I found “memory” as another important component in “spatial entitlement”.
To show how memory helps collective organizing, Johnson emphasizes the history of AfricanAmericans in Mexico and the common struggle of Afro-mestizos. Infrapolitics here wants to
transcend boundaries of one’s own community in order to connect other possible coalition
building efforts. In this sense, spatial entitlement has much more potential for organizing a social
movement. In brief, Scott, Certeau, Bhabha, and Johnson focus on the everyday form of
resistance, but what makes Johnson stand out is her investment in the politics of space. She goes
on to articulate the significance of creating everyday space by mobilizing coalition here and now
and projecting spaces towards future as she argues:
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Struggles for freedom and equality currently engaged by multiracial social
justice movements emerge from the enduring historical relevance of BlackBrown spatial struggles and coalitional politics. It is a past whose legacy has
too much power to remain unacknowledged and unexamined, particularly as
evidence of what cultural workers and community activists have already
accomplished on the road to a just future (xxii).
Johnson’s spatial entitlement thus relies on a legacy of struggle across ethno-racial
boundaries to usher in a just future.
In a similar vein, Andrea Smith, in her Native Americans and the Christian Right: The
Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances (2008) emphasizes reframing issues for coalition
building in an attempt to achieve support from unlikely allies. While Johnson shows likely
alliances between racial minorities of black and brown folks, Smith emphasizes unlikely
alliances in a recuperative move that seeks to work upon the stagnancy of political imagination, a
stagnancy that situates Native Americans and Christian evangelicals as unlikely partners in the
first place. It is often thought that Native Americans and white evangelicals would likely pursue
different goals in their respective and necessarily separate activism. The source of such belief
resides in valuing the ease in organizing activists from the homogenous groups centering on a
single vector of differences: either race or class, for example. But such ease in organizing may
prevent us from achieving larger goals: instead of placing demands within rights-based frames,
we must attempt the reconfiguration of structures of power that always dictate terms of rights,
pacify dissent here and there, and appropriate forms of resistance that become threatening—all to
maintain the status quo of any tyrannical system. Therefore, it becomes a radical move as Smith
promotes coalitional politics and not identity politics. Smith shows how both the Native
Americans and the Christian Right can foreground pragmatic collaboration. As an example, she
explains how Native environmental activists can go beyond their own communities and find
allies among white progressive ecojustice activists. Smith rightly marks the danger in such
alliances, as white ecojustice activists may appropriate the agenda of the Native environmental
activists. But she is also careful to debunk the myth of appropriation, a stalemate reinforcing
boundary drawing activism in both communities. She does so by proving examples of an
innovative tactic: re-centering Native concerns in the context of the Christian evangelicals. As a
case study, Smith shows how the coalition between the Christian Right and American Indians
orchestrated a successful campaign across white and non-white communities. As a result, Exxon
and Rio Algom were compelled to stop mining in Wisconsin, which pollutes water bodies and
forests, sources for fishing and hunting for Native Americans.
Thus, reframing separate activism while taking initiatives for coalition building is what
Smith theorizes as the ‘politics of articulation’. She believes that mere representation of reality to
outsiders and hope for support to arrive may reinforce a hegemonic condition instead of
combating it. She thus emphasizes becoming an actor of social change. Based on the observation
by Laclau and Mouffe, Smith argues: “our task is not to organize the revolution but to organize
ourselves for the revolution; not to make the revolution but to take advantage of it” (xvii).
Smith’s politics of rearticualtion depends on enthusiastic organizing of coalitions. Thus, it is
different from Scott’s spontaneous or natural form of resistance in the Malaysian farmers.
Compared with Smith’s project, Scott’s infrapolitics reinforces hegemony instead of combating
it.
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“Native people are thought to be hopelessly mired in identity politics, concerned only about
cultural particularities (xi)”, Andrea Smith observes. She argues that going beyond the
conventional and fossilized notion of allies and adversaries is important for all of us, partly
because we can rightly identify ourselves as playthings in the hands of biopolitical power-blocks
within the neoliberal capitalistic system of management of differences, and mainly because we
want to mobilize emancipatory politics as resistance to hegemonic forces. Transcending the fixed
boundaries between allies and adversaries can open up a new vista of micro-politics, as Smith
emphatically reminds us: “[i]n doing so, we might open ourselves to unexpected strategic
alliances with groups across the political spectrum that furthers our politically progressive goals
(xi)”. Basically, Smith wants to reconceptualize identity politics as coalitional politics. Also, she
wants to move towards a new politics that goes beyond the left- versus right-wing politics. Using
“religious and political configurations of Christian Right and American Indian activism (xi-xii)”,
Smith rethinks “the nature of political strategy and alliance building for progressive purposes”
(xii).
Thus, understanding the potential of spatial micropolitics confirms one thing: spatial
micropolitics and macropolitics are not mutually exclusive but supplementary. Binary
juxtaposition of them may create a “systemic vacuum” or intellectual blockade within which any
initiation of resistance will be derided as inadequate. To prevent this intellectual blockade, it is
important to recognize the radical potential of Johnson’s spatial entitlement and Smith’s politics
of articulation as I have explained above. I will once again state that for Scott, Certeau, and
Bhabha, infrapolitics is basically disconnected from any vestige of collectivity. For them,
attempting to avoid the grip of any manipulative system is the only option left. Transforming the
system is not the objective of their project. As a result, their infrapolitics ignores not only
Johnson’s memory and spatial entitlement but also Smith’s politics of articulation. Scott,
Certeau, and Bhabha make infrapolitics solely individualistic. In a sense, their micropolitics is
one step behind identity politics and two steps behind coalitional politics, vis-à-vis the emerging
necessities of a new kind of infrapolitics in our time.
III: Understanding Problems of Micropolitics: Toward a Dialectical Praxis
The reform-revolution dyad in academia plays out in the binary formation and parallel
juxtaposition of micropolitics and macropolitics. As I want to go beyond the longstanding
reform-revolution dyad and argue for dialectic between micropolitics and macropolitics within
all acts of resistance, it is important to locate a theoretical configuration of the proposed
spatiotemporal dialectic. Also, it is important to respond to the following questions: What is
spatiotemporal dialectic? How is it different from Marxian and Hegelian dialectics? How does it
help to conceptualize and advance the dialectic between micropolitics and macropolitics?
Among the different developments of dialectical frameworks, I have found David Harvey’s
spatiotemporal dialectic much helpful. An understanding of this particular dialectic shows why
micropolitics, infrapolitics, and identity politics are inadequate to challenge the intertwined
systems of injustice in a crisscrossed web of neoliberal global capitalism, biopower, racism,
sexism, ableism, patriarchy, imperialism, and so on. Also, an understanding of the
spatiotemporal dialectic advances the dialectic between micropolitical and macropolitical
resistance.
First, I will briefly compare the Marxian dialectic with the Hegelian dialectic. Then I will
explain why I believe Harvey’s spatiotemporal dialectic can help us understand the problems in
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infrapolitics, micropolitics, and identity politics. Marx was careful to explain the difference
between the Hegelian dialectic, which is mystifying, idealistic, and metaphysical, and his version
of dialectic, which is rational, historicist, and material. In his version of the dialectic, Marx
rejects Hegel’s metaphysical essence of history. In the ‘Afterword’ to the second German edition
of Capital, he replaces Hegel’s mystified form of dialectics with his own rational form. The
rational dialectic “regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and
therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it
lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary”4.
Marx, therefore, emphasizes the historicist and materialist character of social realities and
denies their natural or absolute character. This is very significant, especially because this rational
dialectic would reject the uncritical and popular acceptance of the present status quo within the
neoliberal capitalist system as permanent, absolute and invincible. Also, it encourages a
spatiotemporal understanding of social phenomena. Because of this historicist and materialist
aspect of Marx’s dialectic, however, I do not agree with David Harvey when Harvey finds an
“indifference to space and time” in Marx’s rational dialectic (Harvey: 98). The historicist and
materialist nature of Marxian dialectic does not have any conflict with the spatiotemporal
dimensions Harvey attempts to develop. David Harvey, however, finds a privilege of time over
space in Marxist dialectic as he argues:
The insertion of spatial consideration into most forms of social theorizing
(dialectical and nondialectical) often turns out to be profoundly disruptive of how
theory can be specified and put to work. Social theories' metanarratives (such as
those provided by Marx and Weber) usually concentrate on processes of temporal
change, keeping spatiality constant (p. 9).
Harvey’s allegation against Marx about his indifference to space does not much hold when
we consider Marx’s critique of ‘abstract labor’5 in capitalist economy in which the traces of
qualitatively different labor from different times and places are wiped out as part of an
inevitable process of profit making. In a capitalist economy, labor is made to appear as
‘abstract’ in the sense that both the laborers’ ‘concrete’ or individual labor has only one value
dimension, which is ‘use-value’, and their relationship to the products they produce are made
disremembered or totally forgotten. Without this disremembering, no product can achieve
‘exchange-value’ or value as a commodity. The hazardous working environment in which
garment workers work in Bangladesh or Vietnam, for example, are an integral part of the
laborers’ ‘concrete labor’. But such contextualization of space, and laborers’ risky working
hours must be disregarded or shunted into oblivion in the profit making conditions capitalists
must rely on. Thus, Marx’s distinction between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete labor’ evidence his
awareness of variables of time and space.
Nevertheless, it is true—as Harvey confesses—that “Marx chose never to write out any
principles of dialectics … the only way to understand his method is by following his
practice”(p. 48). Perhaps, this makes Harvey interested to develop spatiotemporal dialectic as
more like an improvement upon than a negation of Marx’s dialectic though he argues that an
“[e]scape from the teleologies of Hegel and Marx can … most readily be achieved by appeal to
the particularities of spatiality (network, levels, connections)” (Harvey, 1996, 109).
In an essay titled “The Dialectics of Spacetime”, David Harvey proposed two dimensions of
the spatiotemporal dialectic: the first one consists of three definitions of space and time:
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absolute, relative and relational. The second dimension, which he borrows from Henry
Lefebvre, consists of another three different definitions: experienced, conceptualized, and lived.
I will briefly explain each of the definitions of space and time, first within the first dimension:
(a)
Absolute: Absolute space refers to the realm of fixed and measurable place.
Absolute time is also fixed, measurable and linear. No two objects or persons can be
exactly at the same space at any given time and that is how absolute space and time are
“socially exclusionary” (p. 99).
(b)
Relative: Whereas absolute space and time are all about the realm of fixity, stasis,
and determination, relative spacetime is “the spaces of process and motion” (p. 100)
(emphasis original). Space, in the realm of relative, cannot be perceived in isolation from
time. Harvey thus refers to this as space-time. At this level, the boundary of absolute
space and time conforms to the logic of indeterminacy and relativity. The concept of
absolute time and place gets replaced by the idea of relative time and space. Individualist
identity becomes relative and multiple identities.
(c)
Relational: In this realm, “space and time are internalized within matter and
process” (p. 101). Space and time, in this realm, are not only simply correlational or
simultaneous but also integrated and fused. Harvey wants to indicate this difference when
he writes of relative “space-time” and relational “spacetime” differently, with different
spelling.
To focus on the second dimension, I will both explain it and examine micropolitics against
the spatiotemporal dialectic developed by Harvey and Lefebvre.
It is helpful to understand the spatial construction of our everyday realities as explained by
Lefebvre in his book titled The Production of Space (1991). It is useful to outline Lefebvre’s
phenomenological accession to the three dimensions of the production of space with the concepts
of the perceived, the conceived, and the lived:
I.
Perceived space: space has a perceivable aspect that can be grasped by the senses.
This perception constitutes an integral component of every social practice. It comprises
everything that presents itself to the senses; not only seeing but hearing, smelling,
touching, tasting. This sensuously perceptible aspect of space directly relates to the
materiality of the “elements” that constitute “space.”
II.
Conceived space: space cannot be perceived as such without having been
conceived in thought previously. Bringing together the elements to form a “whole”, that
is, Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space presumes an act of thought that is linked
to the production of knowledge.
III.
Lived space: the third dimension of the production of space is the lived
experience of space. This dimension denotes the world as it is experienced by human
beings in the practice of their everyday life.
Interestingly, both Certeau’s tactic and Scott’s infrapolitics emerge from their attempt at
theorizing everyday life. But I argue that both Certeau and Scott could have benefitted from
Lefebvre’s understanding of everyday life and social realties.
Lefebvrian lived space maintains a dialectic between the realms of the perceived, the
conceived, and the lived. This dialectic is, in fact, one of the continual making and remaking of
the perceived, the conceived, and the lived. Lived space or Lefebvrian social realties must be
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understood as such as individuals influence and get influenced by historical and material
forces—not only by structures of power such as capitalism, patriarchy, imperialism, and so
forth., but also by vectors of differences: race, class, sex, gender, ability, and so on. In contrast to
Lefebvrian everyday realities, what Certeau and Scott provide as lived realities appear as static
and exclusionary. They are static because Lefebvrian perceived space and conceived space in
them are taken as non-susceptible to changes: the farmers and the poor would never conceive
relative identities, and, thereby, acts of resistance beyond their secluded practices of concealed
protests. Within the projects of Certeau and Scott, it is also impossible to recognize multiple
roles of domination and subordination individuals carry on. They instead foreground the binary
configurations of the powerful and the powerless but leave out what kind of interactions may
happen within and across the marginalized. Hence, Colin Barker critiques Scott’s idea of a
‘hidden transcript’ among the powerless as Barker argues, “Scott, in bending the theoretical stick
against theories of the ‘dominant ideology’, risks treating the world of the hidden transcript as
marked by simple unity and harmonious amity among the oppressed (17).”
The paper, at this point, undertakes a double-move: a theoretical exposure of the inefficacy of
individualistic infrapolitics, and an attempt to spatialize infrapolitics to get it integrated into an
emerging mode of macro- narrative as exemplified in the function of WikiLeaks and some other
social movements grounded in collective infrapolitics.
First, I would like to show how infrapolitics—however self-celebratory it is—tends to be
merely hurling a few stones—verbal or otherwise—of protest, gestures not even necessarily
meant to elicit a direct response, over the thick wall said to separate the populace from the
politicians. The proponents of such gestures seem to believe that the postmodern infatuation with
mere symbolism of performance will suffice. But the politically empty nature of infrapolitics can
be shown using the insights of the theory of space by Lefebvre. It can be argued that neither
Scott’s infrapolitics nor Certeau’s tactic is grounded in a proper understanding of the elements of
“order” and “chaos” in the spatial. What Certeau considers “chaotic” or revolutionary in tactic is,
in fact, a mere whimsical continuation, an extension or a passive following of the same order of
the spatial. To substantiate the argument, let us remind ourselves of Certeau’s tactic again. To
begin with, Certeau argues that
tactics are procedures that gain validity in relation to the pertinence they lend to
time--to the circumstances which the precise instant of an intervention transforms
into a favorable situation, to the rapidity of the movements that change the
organization of a space, to the relations among successive moments in an action, to
the possible intersections of durations and heterogeneous rhythms, etc. (p. 38)
In this definition, the transformation of a strategic arrangement into a “favorable situation” is
no transformation at all, as it is too much dependent on two things: an uncertain wait for a fissure
in the spatial configuration of a system and the innovative use of the imagination by an
individual who would be applying the tactic. Furthermore, a successful application of the tactic
may offer a temporary escape route, or a short-term relief, but one cannot expect any qualitative
change in the system against which one is set to fight in the first place. The denial of this change
emerges from the separation of the individual from the social construction of space and also from
an inadequate understanding of the spatial construction of society.
The second allegation against tactic can be perceived from Massey’s discussion of “chaos”,
and “order” in the spatial. Massey argues that
16
	
  

Catalyst: A Social Justice Forum, Vol. 6, Issue 1

The spatial form was socially ‘planned’, in itself directly socially caused, that
way. But there is also an element of ‘chaos’ which is intrinsic to the spatial. For
although the location of each (or a set) of a number of phenomena may be directly
caused (we know why X is here and Y is there), the spatial positioning of one in
relation to the other (X’s location in relation to Y) may not be directly caused
[…]. Thus, the chaos of the spatial results from dire happenstances juxtapositions,
the accidental separations, the often paradoxical nature of the spatial arrangement
that result from the operation of all these causalities (Massey: 303).
The operation of causalities is the process which authorities use to manufacture consent to
maintain and reinforce Gramscian hegemony, a pervasive influence of structures of power within
which individuals must situate themselves. While Gramsci wants individuals to form counterpower or counter-hegemony, Certeau’s tactic attempts to adjust itself to instead of questioning
this operation of causalities or hegemony. Overall, Certeau’s tactic does not show any interest in
the epistemology of the “chaos” (Massey), an integral constituent of hegemony which seeks to
unsettle the remainder of the hegemony. Chaos is that potential factor of insurgency which may
expose the tyrannical nature of the overpowering order, reasons, or causalities at work in an
existing hegemonic formation. The function of the chaos, an exposure of the tyranny of the
hegemonic logics and of the order, of the hegemonic logics (?) themselves can be conceptualized
within Lefebvrian understanding of social realties, within constant making and remaking of the
perceived, the conceived and the lived, as explained above. Therefore, we might conclude that
the spatializing of tactic implies a radical reconceptualization of Certeau’s project of resistance
along the line of counter-hegemonic struggles.
To elucidate the spatialization of infrapolitics, I would like to argue that WikiLeaks has
created windows for the surplus of the lived space (Lefebvre) to “see” and develop a concrete
understanding of the remainder of the hegemony, the constant renewal of the consent of the
people, on which the appropriating systems, i.e., the state, the society, and so forth heavily rely.

17
	
  

Catalyst: A Social Justice Forum, Vol 6, Issue 1

The following diagram helps to clarify the argument:

Figure1.1: The Production of Space
The concept surplus of the lived space is developed by Lefebvre to refer to the realm of the
inexpressible, the remainder, and the which cannot be exhausted by theoretical analysis. The
surplus has a particular spatiotemporal relationship with the dialectic of the perceivedconceived-lived space, but it is easier to identify it as a temporal sequence, a result of reflection
on the dialectic,+ as if the surplus comes after reflection. But the surplus is a constant or
interactive aspect of the triad. Lefebvre argues that the surplus can be perceived by all but can
only be communicated in and through artistic expressions. This surplus has subversive potential,
but it often gets appropriated by the hegemony. In other words, this surplus is a perpetual prey to
the renewal of the hegemony. As Gramsci explain in his Selections from the Prison Notebooks
(1917), hegemony is a pervasive ideological domination of the powerful class, domination not by
force but by consent. The objective of hegemony is producing those versions of reality that
people eventually accept as “common sense”, as “the general sense, feeling or judgment of
mankind, more precisely, as the cluster of beliefs felt to be true by most people (Salamini: 83).”
In other words, the surplus is made victim to the constant attempts on the part of the
hegemonic forces to renew, energize, and reinforce the manufacturing of consent. The
hegemonic forces (mis)guide the surplus in the sense that they make sure that the surplus does
not become threatening for, let alone antagonistic or hostile to them. In order to (mis)guide or
misappropriate the surplus, the hegemonic forces are in a constant manufacturing of consent to
the authoritative forces in the society. This particular aspect of hegemony, which attempts to
achieve reproduction of renewal of consent, is what I like to call remainder of the hegemony.
WikiLeaks opens windows for all to see concretely the (mis)guidance of the surplus by
hegemony. “They know it but they are doing it anyway” becomes undeniable to even to the
hegemonic forces themselves (Žižek: 30). This new and concrete knowing destabilizes the
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causalities or order within a tyrannical system. In other worlds, it inspires chaos or insurgence by
delegitimizing consent within the hegemonic system. It may also be used for coalition building
across vectors of differences: race, class, sex, gender, ability, and so on. Thus, it may lead to
counter-hegemonic struggle or activisms in an attempt to move from the war of position towards
the war of maneuver, the war of position and the war of maneuvering being Gramscian phases
on a continuum in which the first phase or the war of position refers to “a prolonged struggle for
the adherence of the general population and the achievement of political power, generally
without insurrection of armed struggle (Omi and Winant: 143)”. Coalition building within and
across multiple vectors of difference should occur within the war of position. But this phase is
not the end point since it would gradually usher in the war of maneuver, “ historical stage where
everything is condensed into one front in one strategic moment of struggle for the purpose of
opening a single victorious breach in the enemy’s defense (Ling : 12).” It is helpful to notice that
the war of position is a struggle across different fronts in the society so that these different fronts
can gradually get organized as one front and execute the war of maneuver, the violent overthrow
of the tyrannical system in order to construct a just one.
WikiLeaks, as Julian Assange says, cannot make the revolution for people; it can inspire
one. So, the function of WikiLeaks can be shown in the following diagram:

Figure 1.2 (a): The Function of WikiLeaks
The “W” stands for WikiLeaks and the upper arrow shows a one way direction from the
“surplus of lived space” towards the “remainder of the hegemony”, meaning the lived space’s
accommodation of a concrete understanding given by the latter. The letter “M” above the second
arrow means social movement while the arrow itself indicates a two way process indicating that
mere understanding will not be enough; people should initiate counter-hegemonic struggles. The
world requires the involvement of the masses and spatial infrapolitics beautifully embraces this
spirit of involvement. Assange’s interpretation of the function of WikiLeaks reflects this
theoretical frame. He believes that WikiLeaks unveils the pretentious claims of the liberal
ideologues by creating a situation which they are unable to deny (Brevini et.al: 66). This is what
I would like to call the movement of the surplus of the lived space towards the remainder of the
hegemony.
Badiou marks the uprisings in the 21st century as riots: immediate, latent, and historical.
Immediate riot is immediate unrest protesting violence of the state. It is often the preliminary
form of historical riot. It is participated in by a segment of the population. It is spearheaded by
youth, often in clashes with the police. Immediate riot is full of tactical innovations: use of
Facebook, Twitter, and other technologies for communication helps in forming quick assemblies.
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Also, fire, drums, leaflets, temporary retreat through backstreets, slogans, the ringing of bells
makes the assembly gradually bigger and lively. Despite use of innovative tactics, immediate
riots have “inadequacies in discipline, strategic tenacity and moderation, when required, […]
(Badiou: 22-23).” The inadequate strategy is perceived when the immediate riot hardly gets
extended beyond the original site of assembly. Like a blind force, it smashes things on its way
and around it but cannot go beyond the level of weak localization. It fails to get people at
different intersections involved. It fails to articulate any “universalizable intention” (Badiou: 23)
beyond immediate rage and dissent. With strategic moderation, however, an immediate riot can
pave the way for a historical riot.
Latent riots manifest quasi-riotous features: they tend to go beyond distinctive group
belonging. One example of this is proxy strikes in which wage-earners go on strike, though they
do not stop working. In fact, it is almost impossible for workers to stop work and go unpaid. So,
people who do not work in that given factory or other establishment come up with an assembly,
occupation, or strike with the agreement of the actual workers. What makes this riot unique is “a
shared localization” (Badiou: 30), unlike the limited localization of the immediate riot.
A historical riot is “the transformation of an immediate riot” (Badiou: 33). Unlike the
immediate riot, it does not extend by imitation but by qualitative extension. One sign of this
extension is participation of people from all sectors: students, workers, intellectuals, family
members, women, employees, civil servants, and even some police officers and soldiers, among
others. Badiou argues: “a riot becomes historical when its localization ceases to be limited, but
grounds in the occupied space the promise of a new temporality; when its composition stops
being uniform, but gradually outlines a unified representation in mosaic forms of all the people;
when, finally, the negative growling of pure rebellion is succeeded by the assertion of a shared
demand, whose satisfaction confers an initial meaning of the word ‘victory’ (Badiou: 35).”
For Badiou, only the historical riot can end an intervallic period—a time when revolutionary
ideas remain dormant—and pave the way for qualitatively different kind of organized politics.
Badiou believes that Western World has not seen a historical riot in four decades. Therefore, the
intervallic periodof neoliberal capitalist control, the period from the 1980s to today, continues.
I would argue that Badiou’s historical riot occur within Harvey’s dialectical tension between
absolute space, relative space and the relational space. Immediate riot occurs in Harvey’s
absolute space:
“[…] an immediate riot is located in the territory of those who take part in it.
[…] An immediate riot, stagnating in its own social space, is not a powerful
subjective trajectory. […] That is not to say that an immediate riot stops at one
particular site. […] [a]n immediate riot spreads not by displacement, but by
imitation (Badiou, 23-24).
Spreading of immediate riot towards other cities, however, does not contribute to “qualitative
extension” (Badiou: 34) which is required to bring forth the historical riot. Latent riot is also
limited in demanding qualitative changes. Consequentially, both latent and immediate riot do not
go beyond Harvey's absolute and the relative spaces whereas historical riot can occur only within
the dialectical tension between the absolute, the relative, and the relational. The entire process
can be shown in a flow chart (see appendix). It is obvious that Badiou would accept the Marxian
dialectic. Badiou analyses contemporary uprisings in historicist and materialist terms. He even
considers these uprising as a repetition of history with a demand for more qualitative changes.
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For him, the global popular rising “naturally resembles the first working class insurrections of
the nineteenth century” (Badiou: 5). However, I believe that the dialectic of social movements
for Badiou, as explained above, is more like the dialectic of Harvey than of Marx.
Micropolitics is individualistic or hyper-personalized. As individualistic, it remains trapped
within the level of personal anguish of the “lived space” (Lefebvre). Though it is often argued
that this personal anguish has a subversive potential, that subversive potential—within the scope
of micropolitics at least—often gets appropriated by the “remainder of hegemony”. Scott and
Certeau would argue for the collective dimension of micropolitics, offering their finding that
many individuals together build a culture of resistance against systemic manipulation. For Scott,
the poor peasants in Malaysia, for Chatterjee6, the poor slum dwellers in Kolkata, and for
Certeau, the consumers as activists in the metropolis, for example, offer a collective insurrection
against the manipulative systems of power: the landlords, the nation-state agencies, and the
corporate capitalist forces. However, this micropolitical collective at best remains
“mechanistically” collective. By mechanistically collective, I refer to Scott’s peasants, for
example, who practice subterranean, collectively unconscious, and decidedly concealed practices
of insurrection—which are identified and subsequently theorized as “hidden transcript” by James
C. Scott. I have concerns regarding this “collective form of micropolitics as resistance” as it is
routinely endorsed by the proponents and the followers of micropolitics. First, it remains within a
kind of horizontal affinity-building effort, not ambitious enough to cross boundaries of class,
group, caste, and other intersectional vectors. Consequentially, it replicates the logic and danger
of the division of labor embedded in the capitalist mode of production.
But the very claims of going beyond “the realm of the personal” and “becoming collective”
needs to be examined to understand the very nature and scope of the collective solidarity. To
begin with, the collective in micropolitics is devoid of any organic orchestration of agency, as
this sort of collective does not emerge or evolve from any urge to move towards the dance of
dialectic7. I will explain the dance of the dialectic below, but first, I will explain diving and
dissent.
It is helpful to recognize different modes of resistance within Harvey’s understanding of the
dialectic between absolute space, relative space, and relational space. With the neoliberal
capitalistic management of differences, individuals as “vulnerable constructs of biopower” are
encouraged to compromise with all forms of systemic manipulation. This is the only mode of
survival and progress offered by neoliberal capitalistic forces. We can call it “diving” into the
system. Bhabha’s mimicry and hybridity, for example, are ways of making compromise through
which diasporic communities in the metropolis get integrated with the manipulative system. No
collective efforts are necessary. Individuals can attempt this “diving” and come out as successful.
The micropolitical collective or organizing, unless spatialized, remains at the level of
“dissent” towards systemic manipulation but hesitant and incapable of radically challenging,
attacking, and transforming the system itself. The urge to transform as opposed to the urge to
survive through compromise can be felt only with an understanding of the dance of the dialectic
which in turn is based on the understanding of the dialectic between absolute space, relative
space and relational space. I will explain the dance of the dialectic at this point.
At the absolute level, we tend to think ‘present’ disconnected form past and future. Worse,
we prefer to be ignorant of other aspects of space and time: the relative and the relational. But we
need to recognize the dialectic between all three dimensions of space and time. Their relations
are not hierarchical but they are in perpetual overlapping or in a constant tension. Spatial
micropolitics (as in Johnson and Smith) have the potential to usher in the spatiotemporal
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dialectic in our political imagination. Fragmented and fetishized micropolitics, however, prefers
to remain in the absolute (as in Scott and Certeau) and the relative (as in Bhabha) only. A dance
of the dialectic in this context would mean mobilizing resistance along the dimensions of the
spatiotemporal dialectic towards revolution. In the context of our examples, it would mean
mobilizing ‘spatial micropolitics’ towards Badiou’s ‘historical riot’.
The figure below gives an overview of my description of micropolitics herein.
Scott and Certeau

Foucault and Deleuze

Bhabha

Vicarious flight from
Absolute to Relational

Relational can be
reconfigured in the
absolute

Working on the relative
will reconfigure
The relational.

Dissent

Dissent as Dance

Dive

Individualistic

Individualistic

Individualistic

Collectivity is
mechanistic

Collectivity is
linear

Collectivity is not
necessarily
required

Figure 1.2 (b): An Overview of Micropolitics As Described Herein
I consider all micropolitics charted above inadequate in the sense that they are indifferent to
the spatiotemporal dialectic. Scott and Certeau decidedly limit their politics within the absolute.
If their infrapolitics or tactics have any sense of collectivity, it is taken as natural as alliance of
the oppressed which is more of a byproduct or symptom of the systemic oppression. It is more
escapist and non-resisting than dissenting or confrontational. Bhabha’s mimicry and sly civility,
in contrast, are simply adaptive. They consider merging with the manipulative power structures
as a mode of avoiding the manipulation itself.
Situating macropolitics and micropolitics in a binary configuration as Deleuze and Guattari
do is problematic as it is argued, “politics is simultaneously macropolitics and micropolitics
(1987: 213).” But, while they emphasize simultaneity, Harvey and Lefebvre see a dialectic
between the micropolitical and the macropolitical.
Deleuze reads dialectic as synthesis of contradictions or differences. To him, dialectic
attempts to establish higher unity among diverse forces in social realities. Deleuze hence says,
“What I detested more than anything else was Hegelianism and the Dialectic (Deleuze: 112). It
does not want to synthesize anything but emphasizes constant becoming or unbecoming, which
is also objective of their project. Deleuze considers desire as free-floating will power seeking to
establish fragmented and random connection with material realities. Spatiotemporal dialectic
recognizes this fragmented and random connectivity, but only in its absolute and relative
aspects, and in the relational aspect the dynamic between the absolute, the relative, and the
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relational becomes obvious. So, the spatiotemporal dialectic, with all of its integral aspects,
reveals a constant interplay between stasis and dynamism.
Foucault and Deleuze imagine “dive” as “dance”. Deleuze emphasizes the molecular
operation of desire and will-power as revolutionary as he says: “no revolution ever takes place
without the investment of desire (Holland: 103).” Thus he finds the micro or the molecular as
subversive. He also subordinates the macro or the molar to the micro or the molecular. Foucault,
on the other hand, promotes the technology of the self as revolutionary: “Foucault saw
individuals as self-determining agents capable of challenging and resisting the structure of
domination (Besley: 21)”. Thus Deleuze and Foucault conceptualize counter-power and desire
in the realms of the absolute and relative. They carry a kind of phobia about the relational as it
would mean stasis and fascism for them. Hence neither Foucault nor Deleuze and Guattari can
go beyond the project of personal growth and development and present any consistent politics
of the social: “whereas Foucault failed to account for the legitimacy of radical politics, Deleuze
and Guattari have no theory of why revolutionary desire is preferable over fascist desire (Best
and Kellner:108).” Overall, it can be argued: micropolitics as proposed by Scott, Certeau,
Bhabha, Foucault, and Deleuze builds on the absolute and relative spaces but carefully avoids
relational space.
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Notes
1. See Alison Kafer. Feminist, Queer, Crip. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013:29.
2. See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Empire (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000).
3. See Sarah Lamble. “Queer Investments in Punitiveness”. Queer Necropolitics. Edited by Jin
Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman and Silvia Posocco. New York: Routledge, 2014.
4. The quote in the question has been taken from the volume 1 of Capital by Karl Marx. See
https://www.marxists.org/subject/dialectics/marx-engels/capital-afterward.htm
5. See Moishe Postone. Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's
Critical Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 152.
6. See Partha Chatterjee. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most
of the World (New York: Columbia UP, 2004).
7. See Bertell Ollman. Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 2003.
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Appendix
The flow chart shows how the project of spatialized micropolitics considers revolution as a
process. It is an extension of figure 1.1 and 1.2 to and explains how the surplus of the lived space
can follow different paths occurring as dive, dissent, and dance. Whereas immediate and latent
riots are manifestations of dissent, it requires historical riot, through a dance of the dialectic to
make radical transformation of a given system.
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